Outrage without consequences?: post-Snowden discourses and governmental practice in Germany by Dimmroth, Katharina et al.
www.ssoar.info
Outrage without consequences?: post-Snowden
discourses and governmental practice in Germany
Dimmroth, Katharina; Steiger, Stefan; Schünemann, Wolf J.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Dimmroth, K., Steiger, S., & Schünemann, W. J. (2017). Outrage without consequences?: post-Snowden discourses
and governmental practice in Germany. Media and Communication, 5(1), 7-16. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.814
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 7–16
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v5i1.814
Article
Outrage without Consequences? Post-Snowden Discourses and
Governmental Practice in Germany
Stefan Steiger 1,*, Wolf J. Schünemann 2 and Katharina Dimmroth 3
1 Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg University, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany;
E-Mail: stefan.steiger@ipw.uni-heidelberg.de
2 Institute of Social Sciences, Hildesheim University, 31141 Hildesheim, Germany;
E-Mail: wolf.schuenemann@uni-hildesheim.de
3 Institute of Political Science, Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, 52074 Aachen, Germany;
E-Mail: katharina.dimmroth@ipw.rwth-aachen.de
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 31 October 2016 | Accepted: 20 January 2017 | Published: 22 March 2017
Abstract
In 2013 Edward Snowden’s disclosures of mass surveillance performed by US intelligence agencies seriously irritated politi-
cians and citizens around the globe. This holds particularly true for privacy-sensitive communities in Germany. However,
while the public was outraged, intelligence and security cooperation between the United States and Germany has been
marked by continuity instead of disruption. The rather insubstantial debate over a so-called “No-Spy-Agreement” between
the United States and Germany is just one telling example of the disconnect between public discourse and governmental
action, as is the recent intelligence service regulation. This article considers why andwhere the “Snowden effect” has been
lost on different discursive levels. We analyze and compare parliamentary and governmental discourses in the two years
after the Snowden revelations by using the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) to dissect the group-
specific statements and interpretive schemes in 287 official documents by the German Bundestag, selected ministries and
agencies within the policy subsystem. These will be analyzed in reference to actual governmental practice.
Keywords
cyber security; discourse analysis; dispositive analysis; German–US intelligence cooperation; surveillance
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Post-Snowden Internet Policy”, edited by Julia Pohle (WZB Berlin Social Science Center,
Germany) and Leo Van Audenhove (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium).
© 2017 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
When the Snowden revelations exposed the extensive
surveillance practices established by theUSNational Secu-
rity Agency (NSA) and the British Government Communi-
cations Headquarters (GCHQ) in June 2013, international
criticism loomed large. Among US allies, Germany has
been one of the most vocal critics of the revealed surveil-
lance measures. Chancellor Angela Merkel most promi-
nently expressed German discomfort in October 2013,
when she said “spying among friends is completely unac-
ceptable” (Troianovski, Gorman, & Torry, 2013).While crit-
icism was also expressed in parliament and a commission
of inquiry was set up in early 2014, actual cooperation
with the US remained relatively stable. Furthermore, in
2016 the federal government proposed a new legislative
framework for the German foreign intelligence agency
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) thatwas approved by the
German Bundestag in October of the same year. The
new law, according to many experts (Bäcker, 2016; Papier,
2016; Wetzling, 2016), legalizes extensive governmental
surveillance practices and may even be unconstitutional.
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It is this seemingly paradoxical mismatch between
harsh criticism and stable cooperation that we are going
to analyze within the scope of this article. Our main re-
search questions are therefore: How is it possible that
Germany was a vocal critic of the revealed spy practices
and nevertheless maintained a stable cooperation with
the US? As even a superficial look into the public and po-
litical debates in Germany reveals, there has clearly been
a “Snowden effect” in Germany,which has brought the is-
sue of mass surveillance to the fore of public policy. Why
has it not led to a significant change in regulation or the
practices of governmental agencies?Where and why did
the Snowden effect get lostwithin different discourse for-
mations (parliamentary, governmental)?
Up to now, research on governmental reactions
to the Snowden revelations has been published only
scarcely. When discussed, German government reac-
tions have been covered with a focus on arguments
legitimizing surveillance measures (Schulze, 2015). We
will go further by also analyzing the parliamentary de-
bate and investigating the practical implications of pos-
sible discursive shifts with a deeper look into the disposi-
tives (institutions, regulations and practices). In the exist-
ing literature, one can identify slightly different perspec-
tives on the German reaction to the disclosed practices.
These views seem to be facilitated by an emphasis on ei-
ther practical consequences or rhetoric. Emphasizing the
harsh criticism following the revelations, Bersick, Chris-
tou and Yi (2016, pp. 176–177) state that:
In the case of Germany, the Snowden affair even un-
dermined the general belief in the normative founda-
tions of the US–German relationship and gave rise to
previously unheard-of criticism of the United States
by German members of the federal cabinet.
Other scholars emphasized that practical relations (es-
pecially security cooperation) between the US and Ger-
many remained stable in the aftermath of the revela-
tions. Segal (2016, p. 150) concludes that “even at the
zenith of the public backlash, cooperation between the
US and German intelligence agencies never stopped”. Se-
gal tentatively argues that this reaction was motivated
by the German “dependence on US intelligence capabil-
ities” (Segal, 2016, p. 143), but his claim is not built on
significant empirical data from the German administra-
tion or parliament. We would like to substantiate this de-
bate and take those findings as a starting point for our
analysis. We agree with Bersick et al. (2016) that lead-
ing politicians in Germany voiced strong criticism against
the US (and the UK) regarding the revelations, and we
also acknowledge in concurrence with Segal (2016) that
practical implications remainedmarginal, as is clearly un-
derlined by the latest developments. But together, both
observations set the puzzle that we are investigating.
In order to provide an answer to our research ques-
tions, the article will proceed in four steps. The next sec-
tion lays out our framework for discourse analysis and
specifies our methodological approach. To illustrate the
reluctant German reactions, the third section presents
a short analysis of the most important practical events
following the Snowden revelations; this part sheds light
on the measures the German government has actually
taken to deal with the revelations. Our empirical analy-
sis of governmental and parliamentary discourse is then
presented in the fourth section. A final conclusion sums
up our findings.
2. Discourses, Dispositives and What Happens in
between: Theory and Methodology
Discourse research has gained ground in political science
in recent years (pars pro toto: Hajer, 2002; Howarth, Nor-
val, & Stavrakakis, 2000; Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008).
Even in international relations and security studies, dis-
course analysis (DA) has become more popular, and the
scope of DA methodology has considerably broadened
(for cyber security and online communication issues see
for instance: Balzacq, 2011; Gorr & Schünemann, 2013;
Xiao Wu, 2012). First of all, we adhere to a Foucauldian
discourse theory (Foucault, 2002), which makes the dis-
course a socio-historically specific knowledge formation
that appears materially manifested in social communica-
tion. Moreover, we apply an approach developed from
the combination of Foucauldian discourse theory and
the Sociology of Knowledge tradition in sociology. The
Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse ([SKAD]
Keller, 2008) has been developed by German sociologist
Reiner Keller since the late 1990s. One crucial advan-
tage of SKAD in relation to other discourse analytical ap-
proaches is that it brings the actor back into focus. SKAD
furthermore provides the analyst with a research frame-
work encompassing a set of basic interpretive schemes,
which complement the interpretive analytics otherwise
adopted from Foucault.
Corpus-building is one of the first and most impor-
tant steps of any solid discourse research. For this study,
we chose an actor-oriented approach. This was relatively
easy for the parliamentary debate, as we selected all
Bundestag protocols dealing with cyber security issues
by using the search function of the official Bundestag
database, entering the search terms “cyber security” and
“cyber attack”. We cut and parsed the resulting proto-
cols to include only the sections that dealt with the rel-
evant issue, since a single Bundestag debate may deal
with a variety of topics. For governmental actors and
agencies, we identified ministries and investigative au-
thorities as the key actors in German cyber security pol-
icy, i.e. the policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1988). The iden-
tified actors were the Federal Government, the Federal
Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the
Federal Ministry of Defense, the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy, the Federal Ministry of Justice
and Consumer Protection and the Federal Office for Infor-
mation Security. We continued our document-gathering
by entering the same query terms of “cyber security”
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(“Cybersicherheit”) and “cyber attack” (“Cyberangriff”)
using the search functions provided by the ministries’
websites. The query terms had been intuitively selected
and then validated using the “relative query term rele-
vance” (RQTR) method proposed by Costas Gabrielatos
(2007). The period of analysis spans the two years follow-
ing the Snowden revelations, i.e. June 1, 2013, to May
31, 2015. The governmental documents we identified by
using our query terms ranged from official ministry re-
ports, interviews and speeches to press releases. Our fi-
nal corpus for analysis consisted of 287 documents in to-
tal, 156 of which came from government offices and 131
from parliament.
As to our interpretive analysis, we analyze our cor-
pus first for the recurrent statements and then look, in
accordance with SKAD methodology, for all sorts of in-
terpretive schemes (some call them frames) included
therein. These patterns of interpretation can again be
divided into subtypes such as narratives, classifications
or subject positions (Keller, 2008). While statements are
thus the basic analytical unit for a discourse analysis, be-
ing based on the social actors’ worldview, i.e. how peo-
ple make sense of the world around them, the inter-
pretive scheme is the overarching analytical category to-
wards which the more concrete and specific interpretive
codes of the researcher are oriented. Our case, for exam-
ple, raises the question of whether the newly disclosed
surveillance activities amount to illegal espionage and a
breach of trust, or whether they are seen and justified as
a legitimate part of a protective role and, thus, an exam-
ple of successful intelligence cooperation.
In addition to SKAD, the Foucauldian term of the
dispositive is also of particular importance for this
study. The dispositive—in the Foucauldian sense and as
adopted by Keller—is an umbrella term for all sorts of
power-effects through which a discourse leaves its last-
ing mark on the world and/or the organization of a given
society. While the discourse is a practice itself and it ap-
pears asmaterialized practice as well, it is still necessarily
transient as knowledge elements are being processed all
the time and never reach a fixed state. However, they do
have long lasting effects on the world and the ordered
living of a society through established practices, regu-
lations, and institutions. The dispositive thus includes
“material objects (buildings, technologies, etc.), practices
(such as the execution of punishments) and elements in
the form of texts (such as the adoption of laws)” (Keller,
2013, pp. 78–79). Changes in regulatory discourses on
public security will likely lead to institutionalization and
intervention into the material world or into the rulebook
of a society. The same can be expected of data protection
or cyber security issues. The “privacy by design” guide-
line, for instance, which has become almost common
sense in many regulatory discourses, is increasingly be-
ing institutionalized in laws or guidelines that could be
labeled as a data protection dispositive. The sequential
and causal logic is not as clear-cut as the examples so
far suggest. Of course, dispositives have repercussions
for discourses as well. The concept of the dispositive en-
compasses not only the effects discourses have on the
world but also the very infrastructure of discourse pro-
duction: “The concept of dispositive means the bundle
of measures that carries a discourse and transposes it
into real-world consequences” (Keller, 2007, p. 50, trans-
lation by the authors). This also makes sense and can
be illustrated with reference to the cyber security sub-
system. The dispositive includes privileged speaker posi-
tions (such as the ministers of the interior or the chan-
cellery) as well as fora of discourse production (such
as the “NSA-Untersuchungsausschuss” or the Parliamen-
tary Control Committee).
3. German Reactions to the Snowden Revelations
In one of her first public reactions to the revelations in
July 2013, Chancellor Merkel already expressed her con-
cerns by highlighting that not all technical possibilities
should actually be used to facilitate surveillance, but she
also expressed sympathy for different needs for secu-
rity in the US and Germany (Federal Government, 2013).
In this statement, she also announced a program to en-
hance privacy in order to deal with the new situation.
One of the program’s key elements took shape in coop-
eration with the Brazilian government. Both Chancellor
Merkel and then President Dilma Rousseff were among
the most prominent surveillance targets and were there-
fore very critical of the practices revealed by Snowden.
Together both governments drafted a UN-resolution to
ensure privacy in the digital age. Resolution 68/167 was
passed by the United Nations General Assembly after
some debate in December 2013 (UN, 2013). The resolu-
tion emphasized:
that unlawful or arbitrary surveillance and/or inter-
ception of communications, as well as unlawful or ar-
bitrary collection of personal data, as highly intrusive
acts, violate the rights to privacy and to freedom of
expression and may contradict the tenets of a demo-
cratic society. (UN, 2013, p. 2)
The passing of the resolution also closely coincided with
a newembarrassment for theGerman governmentwhen
surveillance of Angela Merkel’s cell phone was disclosed
in October (Smale, 2013). While this reaction is con-
nected to privacy concerns frequently articulated in pub-
lic and parliamentary discourses, it is remarkable that the
intergovernmental UNGeneral Assemblywas selected as
a regulatory forum. Given the non-binding character of
UN resolutions, it does not imply any change in practice,
not even by the German government as one of the initia-
tors of the resolution.
In contrast, the establishment of a commission of in-
quiry (the “NSA-Untersuchungsausschuss”) by the Ger-
man Bundestag in January 2014 can be seen as a con-
crete step to re-evaluate the established intelligence co-
operation. Its task is not only to further investigate accu-
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sations against the US and British intelligence agencies
but to also clarify the activities of German agencies. An-
other concretemeasure,which even entailed a change of
practices, came when the federal government, after ne-
gotiations on a “no-spy-agreement” had failed, changed
its practice of contracting a foreign provider by recall-
ing contracts with Verizon in June 2014. Until then the
government had tasked the US-based enterprise with
providing services for its telecommunications infrastruc-
ture. Consequently, Verizon was replaced by Deutsche
Telekom (Hudson, 2014). The decision to replace a US-
based company by a German competitor can be seen as
clearly rooted in the pursuit of digital sovereignty (see
DA below).
In contrast, the temporal and partial disruptions of
the German–US intelligence cooperation that started
in May 2015 (Connolly, 2015), while being an obvious
change in the practices of information sharing, were
more of symbolic value. Information sharing was halted
when it became public that the NSA had used its cooper-
ation with the German BND to spy on targets within Ger-
many and the European Union (EU). But the change only
affected the cooperation in Bad Aibling and, following an
investigation, cooperation was re-established in January
2016 (Mascolo, 2016).
Finally, in June 2016 the German government pre-
sented a new legal framework for the foreign surveil-
lance activities of the BND (Federal Chancellery, 2016).
Since the draft enabled easier information sharing be-
tween intelligence agencies andweakened previously es-
tablished limitations on data collection (Papier, 2016),
it was met with considerable criticism. NGOs and jour-
nalists argued that the government had legalized previ-
ously illegal activities and thereby enhanced the surveil-
lance capabilities of the German intelligence agency
(Deutscher Journalisten-Verband, 2016; Meister, 2016).
Furthermore, critique was also expressed by representa-
tives of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) and the UN (OSCE, 2016; UN, 2016). Nev-
ertheless, the government remained committed to the
new legislative framework and parliament finally passed
the new law in October 2016.
As this short summary clearly shows, the German
government responded quite reluctantly to the revela-
tions and resorted to more symbolic reactions. In 2016
the government even began to enhance surveillance ca-
pabilities. These developments were enabled by differ-
ent governmental and parliamentary discourses that will
be analyzed in the following section.
4. Post-Snowden Discourses Compared: The Debates in
the German Bundestag and the Governmental
Discourse
In the course of our discourse analysis in the wake of
the Snowden revelations, we identified five recurrent dis-
cursive elements that seem particularly important for
understanding what happened to the Snowden effect
in German policy-making. Therefore, we compare how
the respective discursive elements differ between the
statements of parliamentary and governmental speakers.
What is modified and in what way?What gets lost?What
is added? How does all this influence the (un)likelihood
of a change in practices?
4.1. Reduced Need to Act—The Parliamentary Discourse
4.1.1. The Fundamental Problem—The Tense Relation
between Freedom and Security
One of the prevalent discursive trends in parliament af-
ter the Snowden revelations strikes at the very heart
of the matter, explicitly addressing the tension between
freedom and security, which most speakers agree needs
to be re-balanced either towards security (with regard
to terrorism and potential attacks) or towards freedom.
Determining the measures necessary to balance the se-
curity and physical wellbeing of the citizens with their
right to freedom and privacy is of course the key is-
sue for politicians of all affiliations in the context of the
NSA affair.
Most parliamentary speakers tend to come down on
the side of freedom:
These rights to freedom must be protected—against
an overly powerful surveillance state, for example—
because the quest for complete security leads to
tyranny and a lack of freedom. To quote an American,
Benjamin Franklin: Thosewhowould give up essential
Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve
neither Liberty nor Safety. Manfred Grund, CDU/CSU
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2014)
This speaker stands out in particular as his statements
provide one of the few explanations for the emphasis on
one societal good over another:
Freedom is a very important good. It is in fact themost
important good of our constitution. There’s a reason
the enumeration of civil liberties is at the very begin-
ning of our constitution. Manfred Grund, CDU/CSU
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2014)
This is one of the clearest examples of a parliamentar-
ian explaining the prioritization of freedom over secu-
rity. The Grundgesetz serves as a point of reference,
since the rights ensuring freedom for the average Ger-
man citizen are the first to be documented in the consti-
tution. Additionally, a notable moment in parliamentary
discourse is brought aboutwhen one of themembers ref-
erences the “super fundamental right of security”, a term
coined by Interior Minister Friedrich, to make the oppos-
ing argument:
In our negotiations and discussions we’ll now make
it very clear that there is a super fundamental right
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to freedom in the United States as well as here at
home, and we’ll make it clear that the Federal Gov-
ernment [of Germany] isn’t perceiving this affair as
being concluded by a long shot. Michael Hartmann,
SPD (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014)
The call for freedom isn’t particularly surprising given
the massive privacy invasions the Snowden revelations
brought to light. Nonetheless, while the importance of
freedom is invoked, in many cases its absolute value is
diluted by mentioning its close relationship with secu-
rity concerns. The very existence of the freedom v. secu-
rity framing points to the fact that none of the speakers
are disregarding the importance of security as a societal
good. This implies a preparedness for concessions and
may indicate parliamentary tolerance for non-action on
the part of the government.
4.1.2. Digital Sovereignty—The Struggle for Digital
Autonomy
With digital sovereignty, we coded one remarkable inter-
pretive scheme through which the current distribution
of power in cyberspace and the German dependence on
other forces (above all the US) is vehemently challenged.
The respective demand is made quite often in parliamen-
tary debate. It is almost always rooted in the context
of the EU regulatory framework, in which higher auton-
omy seems achievable. Hence, speakersmostly call to de-
velop a European digital strategy:
Ladies and Gentlemen, in light of the excessive data-
gathering by the NSA, it is our central task in Germany
and Europe to reclaim sovereignty over what is done
with our data. We need legal and technical means
to do that. Günter Krings, CDU/CSU (Deutscher Bun-
destag, 2014)
The argument for a renewed sovereignty in the digital
realm also points to the problem of the asymmetrical de-
pendence on the US. This dependence is stated explicitly
in the following example:
This is not about IT-nationalism, but if we take an hon-
est look at the situation, we have to admit that we’re
dependent on US or Asian software and hardware in
many instances. We need our own initiatives in the ar-
eas of research and development. Lars Klingbeil, SPD
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2014)
It is acknowledged that other state actors such as the
US and Asian countries possess more resources in the
area of digital development, something Germany isn’t
able to compete with, at least at the moment. Develop-
ing the ability to counter these dependencies is given
high importance in the wake of the Snowden revelations.
The text sequences coded with the digital sovereignty
scheme are the ones that most clearly challenge the cur-
rent relations and practices between Germany and the
US regarding security issues and intelligence.
4.1.3. Cyber Angst—The New Level of Threat in the
Digital Age
A frequently appearing narrative in both discourses un-
derscores the elevated need for security in reaction to a
higher threat level in the digital age affecting both states
and citizens. This narrative, which we coded with the
term “cyber angst”, explores the many potential threats
cyberspace poses to a state’s security. This includes pos-
sible terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure as well
as criminal activity in the cyber realm. The narrative
serves a securitization logic (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde,
1998), as it is prone to justifying extraordinary surveil-
lance measures. So-called cyber angst, particularly re-
garding critical infrastructure, is a crucial narrative in the
governmental discourse. It is also found in the parliamen-
tary debate:
We need online security, especially within the area
that’s important for our society and country. Commu-
nication on a state levelmust be safe. If wewant to up-
hold critical infrastructure it has to be safe from hack-
ing, attacks and espionage. Hans-Peter Uhl, CDU/CSU
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a)
4.1.4. Post Privacy—It’s a NewWorld
There is another narrative that might serve to reduce the
severity and thus lessen the impact of the Snowden reve-
lationswithin the parliamentary debate. Like cyber angst,
it is also rooted in the newness and paradigm-shifts that
are ascribed to internet development and the digital era.
Cyberspace is depicted by some advocates as such a new
and foreign world that some normative prescriptions, as
central as they may be, cannot fully apply. This narra-
tive implies that modern societies have moved towards
a post-privacy age. Following that argument, the actions
of the US government are not justified per se, but the
societal norm of privacy that is in danger is depicted as
already compromised:
We shouldn’t let citizens believe that they’re still safe
from espionage if they disclose privatematters online.
We have to make that clear, especially to young peo-
ple using Facebook and Twitter among other things.
We have to tell them that everything they put online
stays there and that there’s no digital eraser. That’s an
illusion. We have to tell people that. Hans-Peter Uhl,
CDU/CSU (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a)
The post-privacy narrative comes with another impor-
tant implication: the blame for a privacy breach is put not
only on firms or state agencies that conduct surveillance,
but is also attributed to online users who freely share
private information on the internet. The responsibility
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shifts to citizens, as they are expected to know that in-
formation shared online at any time might be the target
of corporate or government espionage. Given the over-
whelming regulatory demands that internet communica-
tion confronts us with, the best line of defense is seen in
self-regulation instead of government intervention.
4.1.5. Asymmetrical Dependence in the Security Realm
An effective interpretive scheme that potentially reduces
any activism supporting a path-breaking turn in security
cooperation with the US is the continued reminder that
Germany is highly dependent on US intelligence in secu-
rity matters. This asymmetrical dependence is brought
up many times:
Every single one of us knows that attacks in Ger-
many were prevented by US intelligence, that’s part
of the truth of this debate. But we also have to
think about how we’ll prevent future surveillance.
Michael Grosse-Brömer, CDU/CSU (Deutscher Bun-
destag, 2013b)
This statement addresses a need to prevent surveillance
in Germany, while at the same time stating the abso-
lute necessity of US–German cooperation in the secu-
rity realm to prevent terrorist attacks. This discursive el-
ement is the most overt in explaining Germany’s con-
tinued intelligence and security cooperation with the
United States in spite of the Snowden revelations. The
bottom line of this logic seems to be that while Germany
condemns the surveillance, there simply is no other op-
tion to safeguard domestic security apart from cooper-
ating with the US. Additionally, there is an element of
gratefulness towards the US for its role in preventing at-
tacks in Germany, which may inhibit harsh criticism of
their surveillance activities. One speaker addresses the
impossibility of truly faulting the US for its actions while
at the same time relying on them for intelligence:
It won’t impress the Americans if we rightly and le-
gitimately criticize their actions in the NSA affair, but
at the same time, in Germany and Europe, allow our
own defense efforts to erode to the point that we al-
ways have to ask for data and insights from the US
agencies when things get serious. Günter Krings, CDU
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2013b)
If we follow this argument, German officials are in no
position to criticize the US for its surveillance activities
as they provide the very same intelligence that has kept
German citizens safe in the past. The speaker states that
even the legitimate criticism will more than likely fall on
deaf ears in the US if its allies in Europe take few mea-
sures to ensure their own safety and are thus reliant on
their partner overseas. The implied solution is the de-
velopment of intelligence capabilities by Germany and
other European states to lessen the dependence on US
intelligence and gain some equality in the security rela-
tionship and open a dialogue on these matters.
4.2. Refused Need to Act—The Governmental Discourse
4.2.1. The Fundamental Problem—The Tense Relation
between Freedom and Security
Explicit reflections on the relationship between secu-
rity and freedom are even more frequent in the gov-
ernmental discourse. There are distinct differences to
the way parliamentarians discussed it. Representatives
in the Bundestag mainly prioritize freedom over security,
while government officials talk about security as a tran-
scendental good, i.e. a good without which other goals,
including freedom, cannot be achieved:
Security is the prerequisite for freedom. Hans-
Dieter Heumann (Federal Academy for Security Policy,
2015)
When even freedom is seen and depicted as dependent
on security, it is not far to the statement of then Minis-
ter of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich emphasizing secu-
rity as a “super fundamental law” (Bewarder & Jungholt,
2013). If there can be no freedom without security, the
mass surveillance by the US government could even be
portrayed as a way of ensuring freedom instead of en-
dangering it. While this is not uttered explicitly, the im-
plications help to understand why meaningful change in
cooperative practices with the US is not only regarded as
not feasible, but also as not necessary in the end. Further-
more, one governmental document addresses the vary-
ing response to the freedom v. security struggle in differ-
ent countries and puts this down to different historical
experiences:
The balance of freedom and security takes various
shapes in different states for historical reasons. (Min-
istry of the Interior, 2013)
Even though it is only implied here, the idea is that theUS
surveillance is rooted in historical experiences that make
them more likely to come down on the side of security,
particularly the terrorist attacks of 9/11. This is a sympa-
thetic view that seeks to somewhat justify US intelligence
activities, as they have been employed after a traumatic
event that would cause a state to be hypervigilant in se-
curity matters.
4.2.2. Digital Sovereignty—The Struggle for Digital
Autonomy
Standing in contrast to the other recurrent elements, de-
mands for digital autonomy or sovereignty are articu-
lated in a clearer fashion within the governmental dis-
course than in the parliamentary debate. The idea that
Germany must achieve a sort of digital sovereignty—
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mostly in cooperation with the EU—to break free of US
influence was supported even by the German Minister
for the Interior de Maizière:
Our political leverage is significantly defined by our
technological capabilities. Therefore, we have to do
everything possible tomaintain IT capabilities in order
to keep and further build our own technological plat-
forms….The government is going to develop a strategy
to secure national competitiveness. I’ve already said
that this is a modern form of patriotism. Thomas de
Maizière (Ministry of the Interior, 2014a)
In this speech, de Maizière also emphasized that the EU
is crucial to achieving this goal. This also shows that even
though the need for independence from US cooperation
is acknowledged, Germany is not seen as being capable
of achieving this goal alone, i.e. outside of the cooper-
ative framework of the EU. The idea of building a Eu-
ropean counterbalance to US hegemony in digital mat-
ters is one of the few ways in which the Snowden revela-
tions seem to have had a disruptive effect onUS–German
cooperation.
4.2.3. Cyber Angst—The New Level of Threat in the
Digital Age
The narrative that cyberspace is exposing states and their
citizens to a higher level of risk is much more frequently
used in the governmental discourse than in parliament.
There are also differences in the way how it is told. More-
over, the implied claims are presented with much more
certainty as are the derived solutions:
A stable, secure, open and free internet offers great
opportunities: for economic growth and develop-
ment, for good governance and democracy, as well as
for social exchange between people around theworld.
At the same time, it confronts uswith new threats: Nu-
merous states are pursuingmilitary cyber-capabilities,
which might lead to an atmosphere of mutual dis-
trust and conflict. Private actors have showngreat skill
in abusing the net for criminal purposes. Terrorists
have been using the internet for their means. Norbert
Riedel (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015a)
This quote offers insight into the way this particular nar-
rative unfolds. While some positive effects of the cyber
age are acknowledged, the dangers posed by this new
way of dealing with the world are exposed at the same
time. In this instance, two different kinds of threats are
addressed: the atmosphere of distrust created by this
new way states can attack each other and the possibil-
ity of terrorists and criminals using the internet for their
own purposes. In its entirety, this narrative creates an
atmosphere of fear and implicitly justifies using extraor-
dinary means—e.g. mass surveillance—to ensure the se-
curity of a state or society. This comes down to a securi-
tization logic with government officials as the prime se-
curitizing agents (Buzan et al., 1998).
4.2.4. Post Privacy—It’s a NewWorld
While the cyber angst narrative ismore important for the
governmental discourse than for the parliamentary one,
the opposite is true of the narrative according to which
cyberspace has brought about a kind of post privacy era,
as it is much less prominently represented in governmen-
tal discourse than it is in the parliamentary debate. Nev-
ertheless, the narrative is employed as well:
In a changing world that requires answers for the con-
tinued digitalization of our society and newly develop-
ing areas of organization, we cannot simply fall back
on our ordinary patterns of behavior and keep rigid
systems that don’t live up to the challenges of this day
and age. Norbert Riedel (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2015b)
In this instance, the narrative of cyberspace as a new
frontier is used to challenge the outdated strategies used
to deal with these new circumstances. From this per-
spective, a more extreme argument would be possible
by which the revealed mass surveillance of the NSA is
seen as a coping technique employed to deal with the
new challenges cyberspace poses to states and their
governments.
4.2.5. Asymmetrical Dependence in the Security Realm
In contrast to the previous example, there is not much
difference in how the idea of an asymmetrical security
relationship between Germany and the US appears in
governmental and parliamentary discourses. Rather, this
seems to be more or less common sense:
The United States is our most important partner and
our closest ally. The security cooperation with our US
partners is irreplaceable in regards to our domestic
and external security. That’s especially true for the
fight against terrorism. This is the reason we want
to continue and deepen our cooperation. Thomas de
Maizière (Ministry of the Interior, 2014b)
The demand in this quote fromMinister of the Interior de
Maizière is very clear: given the high dependence of Ger-
man security on US intelligence information, there is no
other option to guarantee the security of Germany than
to continue the close security cooperation with the US.
He even goes further by expressing a desire to deepen
the already existing cooperation instead of reducing it.
The way de Maizière frames the cooperation doesn’t im-
ply that it is a necessary evil brought about by Germany’s
own lack of intelligence capabilities in certain areas. On
the contrary, he explicitly names the US as the closest
partner and ally, a role that German government officials
Media and Communication, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 7–16 13
apparently take no objection to even in the wake of the
Snowden revelations. Considering how the actions of the
US government have widely been interpreted as a be-
trayal of its allies, this hints at a relationship that runs
very deeply indeed.
5. Conclusion
Considering the outrage the Snowden revelations pro-
voked in German public discourse, one could have ex-
pected that politicians would react to it with a bundle of
measures to reform policies, institutions and practices in
the security realm. From this perspective, it seemed likely
that especially the close security cooperationwith theUS
would be restrained bymore privacy-sensitive regulation
in this field. However, as we all know by now, the con-
sequences of the Snowden revelations for the German–
US intelligence collaboration have been few and far be-
tween. Security cooperation with the US remained sta-
blemost of the time, and the government even extended
the capabilities of German intelligence agencies with a
new legal framework for foreign surveillance. The re-
forms that have been carried out are rather symbolic in
nature, but some even legalize the revealed practices in-
stead of trying to forbid them. This discrepancy between
public statements and government action is the puzzle
that our research started with. We approached the prob-
lem with a discourse analytical framework. Relying on
the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse, we
comparatively analyzed parliamentary and governmen-
tal discourses in Germany after the Snowden revelations.
In our empirical sections, we identified five recurrent
elements that could be found in parliamentary and gov-
ernmental discourses that facilitated the reluctant reac-
tions in different ways. The first one included all gen-
eral and/or explicit reflections on the tense fundamental
relationship between freedom and security and is thus
rather indifferent regarding the expected consequences;
the debate seems to favor neither side overwhelmingly
and an absolute call for security is rarely made. Addi-
tionally, we found a push for digital sovereignty or au-
tonomy which clearly effected a change of practice with
the German government canceling its contract with Ver-
izon. While this element certainly influenced the move
away from a contractor based in the US, the dependen-
cies addressed also include concerns about Asian compa-
nies, therefore leading to more nuanced thoughts about
which dependencies might be less problematic and how
to avoid them altogether.
While the two elementsmentioned above can poten-
tially either increase or decrease cooperation with the
US, we also found three recurrent elements which all
serve to reduce the perceived severity of theNSA scandal
and thus prevent more resolute efforts to reduce coop-
eration with the US. The first one we called cyber angst.
This element expresses a diffuse anxiety about the new
threats in our increasingly digital world. Fears are stoked
about state and non-state actors using cyberspace to for-
ward their (malicious) goals at the expense of German
society, leading to calls for a more active state response
and more cooperation among trusted allies. The second
element consists of post-privacy narratives. These focus
on the distinct newness of cyberspace and argue that
standards established in the offline world might not be
suitable for the digital world; far reaching surveillance
measures may eventually be normal conduct in the new
medium. Furthermore, the state might not be the most
dangerous actor in this field after all, since big compa-
nies are also engaged in extensive data collection. A re-
luctant response was further facilitated by the argument
of asymmetrical dependence. This element emphasizes
the German dependence on the US in the realm of secu-
rity policy. Proponents of this argument stress the fact
that cooperation with US intelligence agencies helps to
protect German citizens. This is often combined with a
reference to the important role the US has played in Ger-
man history. It is argued that even if surveillance might
be problematic, the US is not the most dangerous threat
to Germany, since there are far more problematic actors
that need to be countered. This argument thereby also
seamlessly connects to the cyber angst narratives.
All in all, given the initial public outrage, the alleged
Snowden effect seems to have diminished over time
through an apparent cascade in sequential logic in the
public discussions examined here. We could identify a
considerable difference between the discourses in parlia-
ment and government. The need for change or stronger
regulation seems reduced already by what is said and ar-
gued in the parliamentary debates. Any call for a con-
siderable regulation that might cause a disruption in
German–US security cooperation is almost completely
disregarded in the governmental discourse.
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